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Smith v. Houston Oilers
87 F.3d 717(5th Cir. 1996)
INTRODUCTION
Sherman Smith C'Sherman") and Tracy Smith ("Tracy"), two professional football
players, sued the Houston Oilers ("Oilers") and members of the Oilers' coaching staff.
The players alleged that after they sustained injuries in the pre-season training camp,
the defendants required their participation in an abusive rehabilitation program under
threats of being dismissed from the Oilers. The plaintiff's also alleged that the
defendant's threatened to prevent them from playing on other teams in the National
Football League.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the
state claims regarding the alleged abusive rehabilitation program on the ground that
those claims were preempted by federal law. Also, the district court remanded to state
court the related state claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The players
appealed the dismissal, and the Oilers cross-appealed the order which remanded the
plaintiffs' claim to state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the dismissed issues based on federal law preemption and vacated the
order remanding the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to state court.
FACTS
Sherman Smith and Tracy Smith contracted to play with the Houston Oilers football
team for one year.' While participating in pre-season training camp during the summer
of 1994, both Sherman and Tracy suffered injuries. Sherman sustained a broken
thumb; while Tracy sustained a tom leg muscle.2 The injuries impeded their ability
to continue with preseason training; thus, the coaches placed Sherman and Tracy in
a routine rehabilitation program along with other injured players.'
During the first week of player-cuts, the Houston Oilers sought to dismiss Sherman
and Tracy from the team.4 However, the National Football League ("NFL") prohibited
teams from terminating football players while they recovered from football related
injuries.' In lieu of a dismissal, the Oilers sought to buy Sherman and Tracy out of
their contracts if they agreed to leave voluntarily.6 Both Sherman and Tracy rejected
the offer.7
According to Sherman and Tracy, as a result of their refusal to accept the offer,
Floyd Reese CReese") and Steve Watterson ("Watterson") of the Oilers organization,
compelled them to submit to severe abuse that stemmed from a "phony rehabilitation
1. Smith v. Houston Oilers, 87 F.3d 717,718 (5th Cir. 1996).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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program."8 Sherman and Tracy believed that Reese and Watterson designed the
program to coerce them into leaving the team. Such alleged abuse included:
"reduction of rehabilitation previously allowed, such as stretching and ice treatment;
sleep deprivation resulting from morning workouts beginning at 4:00 a.m. and evening
workouts ending at 11:00 p.m.; strenuous exercise that far exceeded previous
demands, including humiliating water-barrel-pulling exercises..." 9 Other "veiled"
threats included dismissal for noncompliance with rehabilitation, intentional confusion
as to workout schedules, and threats to prevent Sherman and Tracy from playing for
other NFL teams in the future." Additionally, Sherman and Tracy were the only
players subjected to this program.I
Shortly after the rehabilitation program began, Sherman collapsed during a 4:00
a.m. workout and had to be taken to the hospital. " Subsequently, Tracy's complaint
to the NFL prompted the Oilers to abort the program.
Sherman and Tracy sued the Houston Oilers, Reese, and Watterson in Texas state
court on the grounds of coercion, duress, extortion, assault and battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The Oilers removed to federal court on the ground that
the claims were preempted by §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LIRA").'3 The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
dismissed the claims based on the "abusive" rehabilitation program. Furthermore, the
district court remanded the players' claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
based on the various allegations of threats. Subsequently, the players appealed the
dismissal of their claim that the Oilers prevented them from playing on other NFL
teams. The Oilers cross-appealed the order remanding the players' claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit analyzed two
issues raised by the players and one issue raised by the Oilers on cross-appeal. The
issues the players raised on appeal were whether: 1.) the district court erred in holding
that their claims of abuse were "inextricably intertwined" with the collective
bargaining agreement ("CBA") and hence preempted by §301 of the LMRA; and 2.)
the district court erred in deciding that the Oilers' alleged conduct was not sufficiently
outrageous to override the preemption under §301. "4 The Oilers, on cross-appeal,
claimed that the district court erred in remanding to state court the players' claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from alleged threats by the Oilers'
organization. 15
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 719.
13. Id., citing Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1996).
14. Smith, 87 F.3d at 719.
15. Id.
178 [Vol. VII: 177
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The first issue the court addressed was whether the claims raised by Sherman and
Tracywere "inextricably linked" with the CBA and hence preempted by §301 of the
LMRA. 6 Section 301 of the LMRA states that: "Suits for violation of contract
between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce...may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction."' 7 Courts must determine whether the CBA governs the conduct which
gave rise to the claim.' If the CBA did not condone the activity, there was no
preemption. 9 However, the Supreme Court has held that §301 of the LMRA preempts
state-law claims that are "substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an
agreement made between the parties in a labor contract."2
In this case, the state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress arose
from the mandatory rehabilitation program that both players conceded to participate
in when they signed their contracts. Thus, to adequately decide this issue, the court
would have been required to determine the legality of the rehabilitation terms in the
players' agreements.
Furthermore, courts have held that activities that give rise to emotional distress
claims are generally preempted when such activities are acquiesced to by signing an
agreement 2 By signing the contracts, the court held that the players legally consented
to "challenging workouts and rigorous rehabilitation sessions."22 Thus, the court of
appeals agreed with the district court and concluded that the §301 preemption applied
because: 1.) the CBA authorized NFL teams to compel players to participate in
rehabilitation programs, and 2.) the resolution of the players' state-law claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress would have required the court to analyze the
terms of the agreement between the Oilers and the players.'
The second issue that the players raised was that if their claims were preempted by
federal law, they were entitled to pursue their claims in state court under an exception
to federal preemption. The players cited Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners"' as controlling.' In that case, "a union officer claimed intentional infliction
of emotional distress under California law, alleging that other union officers engaged
in 'outrageous conduct, threats intimidation, and words,' causing him 'grievous mental
and emotional distress as well as great physical damage."' 26 The Court in that case
sustained the plaintiffs preemption challenge and held that federal law did not
preempt the officer's emotional distress claim when the conduct on the part of the
defendants was so egregious that "no reasonable man in a civilized society could be
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 301 (1996)).
18. Smith, 87 F.3d at 719.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,220 (1985)).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 721.
23. Id.
24. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
25. Smith, 87 F.3d at 719-20.
26. Id. at 720 (explaining Fanner, 430 U.S. at 302).
1996]
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expected to endure it."27 Therefore, the exception only applies when the defendant's
conduct is characterized as "outrageous."28
The court of appeals in this case applied the reasoning used in Farmer, but came
to a different conclusion than the Supreme Court in Farmer. Here, the court of
appeals concluded that the Oilers' alleged misconduct of purposefully subjecting
Sherman and Tracy to a rigorous rehabilitation program was not "outrageous" enough
to defeat the preemption standard illustrated in Farmer.29 Thus, both Sherman and
Tracy failed on their alternative issue of an exception to the preemption protection
enjoyed by the Oilers.
The final issue the court addressed was the Oilers' cross-appeal regarding the
district court's decision to remand to state court the players' claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress resulting from alleged threats made by the Oilers.
Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA control this issue. Section 8(a) of the NLRA, in
relevant part, states that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -- 1) to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in [NLRA §7].""3 Section 7, in relevant part, states that "[e]mployees shall have the
right...to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment.."' Because Sherman and Tracy's emotional distress claim
stemmed from the rehabilitation program which was 1.) condoned by the CBA, and
2.) agreed to by the players when they signed their contracts, the appellate court
agreed with the district court and held that §§ 7 and 8 of the NLRA preempted the
emotional-distress claims based on alleged threats made by the Oilers.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Fiflth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the plaintiffs' claims based on the allegedly abusive rehabilitation program. In
addition, the court vacated.and remanded to the district court the claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress with instructions to dismiss those claims as well. The
court reasoned that the "abuse" the players received was not the result of direct acts
of violence by members of the Oilers staff, but was the result of the rehabilitation
process. Thus, the players, by way of signing their contracts, consented to the
rehabilitative process, thereby waiving their right to bring any action against the Oilers
organization as a result of injuries suffered from the rehabilitation program.
Berve M. Power
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 721-722 (citing 29 U.S.C. §158 (aX3) (1996)).
31. Smith, 87 F.3d at 721-722 (citing 29 U.S.C. §157 (1996)).
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